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EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM LEVERAGE. A POLICY ORIENTED SURVEY
This paper surveys the literature that studies the connection between leverage and 
executive compensation. First, we discuss the dynamics of pay-for-performance 
compensation and how to measure it. Then we study the theoretical underpinnings of how 
firm leverage may be related to the compensation structure of its executives. After 
reviewing the empirical work on the topic we survey the policy implications. We discuss 
recent work that shows positive outcomes from regulating executive compensation, but 
that raises a cautionary note: regulating leverage directly seems more efficient than 
regulating executive compensation.
Following the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a lively debate in the academic and 
policy circles about regulating executive compensation to avoid excessive firms’ leverage. 
Some countries have regulated the structure or the level of compensation, especially for 
financial firms, while others have adopted say-on-pay regimes that increase shareholder’s 
weight in the design of executive compensation.
For example, the European Union (Directive 2013/36/EU and CRDIV) has established that 
bonuses at credit institutions and investment firms cannot exceed 100% of fixed salary 
(200% if the company wins shareholder approval). The U.S. is also discussing new rules to 
curb executive compensation in financial institutions [Wall Street Journal (2016)]. Correa and 
Lel (2016) document that eleven countries have passed laws to give shareholders direct 
influence on executive compensation policies (i.e., say on pay laws). In Spain, the “Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital” regulates executive compensation.1 For public companies, the 
“Código de Buen Gobierno” approved in 2015 by the Spanish Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CNMV) recommends the use of deferred compensation and clawbacks clauses.
In this article, we discuss the literature that studies the connection between firm leverage 
and executive compensation. Our survey is selective and guided by two policy questions. 
First, we study the effects of executive compensation on firm’s leverage. We focus on 
whether the structure of compensation affects the willingness to borrow following a credit 
stimulus. Governments and central banks often try to stimulate economic activity by 
promoting credit supply. This is referred to as monetary policy’s risk-taking channel. It was 
especially important during the Great Recession because, once the policy rates hit the 
zero-lower bound, many Central Banks resorted to unconventional policies to lower banks’ 
borrowing costs and expand credit supply [Correia et al. (2016), Gambacorta and Shin 
(2016)]. The literature has focused on what types of lenders react more.2 In this article, we 
discuss papers that focus on the borrowers, which is a relatively unexplored question. This 
work can help us understand in what settings the credit expansion policies of Central 
Banks may have the maximum impact.
Second, we discuss recent work that studies when and how executive compensation 
should be regulated. The literature suggests that it may be more effective to directly limit 
leverage rather than trying to affect it indirectly by imposing limitations on executives’ 
compensation. 
1  Articles 217-220 and 529. 
2  See, for example, Dell’Ariccia, Laeven and Suárez (2017), or Jiménez et al. (2014).
Abstract
1 Introduction
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In this section, we define how the literature measures pay-for-performance compensation. 
After that, we discuss the dynamics of the structure of executive compensation. We use 
CEO and executives as synonyms. The key take-away is that pay-for-performance 
compensation has increased over time, especially since the mid-1980s. 
In the literature, the executive’s exposure to firm performance is called the pay-performance 
sensitivity. To understand better this concept, we consider a simple one period model 
inspired in Edmans and Gabaix (2016). The firm has no debt to simplify. Let S be the firm’s 
equity value at the beginning of the period. 
Let the CEO’s compensation be c=F+S, where θ denotes the CEO’s equity ownership in 
the firm. We assume risk-neutrality. In this case, the pay-performance sensitivity is θ, the 
variation in the executive’s wealth when the stock’s price changes. This measure is also 
known as the CEO’s percentage stake. Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimate this sensitivity 
as follows:
 [1]
∆ denotes the stock option’s delta. Delta measures the degree to which an option is 
exposed to shifts in the price of the underlying asset. Hall and Liebman (1998) show that 
the portfolio of unexercised stock options is the largest component in CEO’s performance-
pay sensitivity. Estimating delta for this portfolio of options can be challenging since firms 
do not typically report the features of options granted in previous years, like their maturity 
or their strike price. Shareholders can manage executives’ pay-performance sensitivity 
(the slope θ) by either granting more shares, more stock options or, in the case of options, 
through their delta. There is a positive relation between stock options’ delta and pay-
performance sensitivity. The executive’s risk exposure increases when the sensitivity 
increases. 
For risk-averse CEOs we cannot ignore the effect of firm volatility on the executive’s 
incentives. Instead of talking of the CEO’s dollar pay we should talk about her certainty 
equivalent wealth, CE. Guay (1999) decomposes the executive’s certainty equivalent 
wealth into two components:
CE = E(wealth)-risk premium                                                 [2]
When the executive is risk neutral, the second element vanishes and we converge to the 
previous analysis. Differentiating equation [2] with respect to firm risk (σ) we obtain the 
following expression:
  [3]
Guay (1999) calls the first element in equation [3],                     , the wealth effect. This effect 
operates through the non-linearity of the executive’s compensation cash flows. Three 
examples: 1) for stock options, this effect corresponds to vega, the option’s sensitivity with 
respect to the volatility of the underlying stock. Vega is positive because of the convexity 
of the option payoffs with respect to the stock price; 2) bonuses that include a compensation 
2  Definitions and Basic 
Facts
2.1 DEFINITIONS
θ =   
 Nr.  shares owned by CEO + Nr. options owned by CEO × ∆
        Nr.  shares  outstanding
∂E(wealth)
∂
∂CE   
=
   ∂E(wealth)   
–
   ∂(risk premium)
    ∂∂∂
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for outperforming certain benchmark and no (or limited) penalty in the case of 
underperformance also exhibit an option-like behaviour with respect to the volatility of firm 
cash flows; 3) in leveraged firm, common stock can be interpreted as a call option on the 
firm’s cash flows with debt’s face value as the strike price [Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. 
The second element in equation [3],                           , is called the risk-aversion effect. 
When shareholders increase pay-performance sensitivity (θ in equation [1]), risk averse 
executives will demand a premium for bearing more firm-specific, non-diversifiable risk. 
Equation [3] says that the size of this premium varies with the executive’s sensitivity with 
respect to firm risk. This sensitivity is higher for non-diversified executives (i.e., when the 
CEO’s compensation is a larger fraction of her total wealth) and for more risk averse 
executives. 
In the case of options, Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) show theoretically that, due to 
the risk-aversion effect, higher stock volatility may actually decrease the value of options 
when options are deep enough in the money (i.e., when the price-to-strike price is large 
enough). This theoretical argument can be extended to any convex, option-like 
compensation structure, like common stock from a levered firm.
Moreover, there are several other features of executive compensation that could affect 
firms’ risk taking. Like trading, option or maturity restrictions, market vs. stock performance 
or severance packages. For instance, severance packages, combined with stock options 
can increase the vega of the executive compensation. 
The literature typically considers two measures of pay-performance sensitivity. The first 
measure is the percentage stake or Jensen-Murphy measure. It corresponds to θ in 
equation [1]. This measure captures the dollar variation of the CEO’s wealth for a given 
dollar variation in firm’s value. In a seminal paper, Jensen and Murphy (1990) study the 
compensation of CEOs in large publicly traded U.S. firms for the 1974-1986 period. They 
estimate that CEOs percentage stake is very low. On average, executive compensation 
increases only $3.25 for every $1,000 increase in firm’s value, which denotes very low 
levels of management ownership. They conclude: “Corporate America pays its CEOs like 
bureaucrats”.
The second measure is the dollar equity at stake, which measures the variation in the 
CEO’s dollar pay relative to the percentage variation in firm’s value. Hall and Liebman 
(1998) calculate the dollar equity at stake among the CEOs of the largest US companies 
from 1980 to 1994. The sensitivity of the median CEO direct compensation (salary, plus 
bonuses, plus new grants of restricted stock, plus stock options) is about 0.3, meaning 
that a 10% stock return leads to 3% increase in CEO dollar compensation. However, they 
also show that the results are different when there is re-pricing of the holdings of stock 
and, especially, the stock options. Taking them into account, the sensitivity increases to 
about 3.9. In other words, a 10% stock return is associated (median value) with a 39% 
increase in the CEO’s dollar pay. This is not the pay-performance sensitivity of a 
bureaucrat!
The structure of CEO compensation is very heterogeneous across countries. Table 1, 
which comes from Fernandes et al. (2013), highlights several stark differences. For 
example, equity-based compensation has a significantly larger weight in the U.S. (39%), 
Canada (32%), and the U.K. (30%) than in the rest of the countries in the sample. 
2.2  MEASURING 
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE
2.3 STYLIZED FACTS
∂(risk premium)
∂
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Table 1 shows the four key components of executive compensation: 1) Salary is fixed, 
non-contingent compensation; 2) Other components may include pension plans, insurance 
benefits and perquisites (like a club membership, for instance); 3) Bonuses are non-equity 
incentive plans based either on the board discretion or on the achievement of certain 
objectives. These objectives can be expressed in terms of accounting performance (like a 
target for earnings-per-share), market performance, or the relative ranking of the firm with 
respect to its peers; 4) The equity-based component includes stock option grants (at their 
Black-Scholes value) and stock grants (at their market value). 
The compensation of CEOs and board members in Spain is regulated by the Governance 
Code of Listed Companies from 2015.3 This Code follows the principle of “comply or 
explain.” It limits the use of stock and stock options to executive board members 
(recommendation #57) and specifies that variable pay in general, and stock and stock 
options in particular, must be subject to vesting period of at least three years and that the 
redemption of stock and stock options is limited to twice the value of their fixed 
remuneration (recommendation #62). 
According to the 2015 Annual Report on the Remuneration of Firm Officers, the mean total 
pay for CEOs among the 35 largest firms in the IBEX-35 was 3.05 million euros.4 Of that 
amount, 46% corresponds to salary, the equity-based compensation (including shares granted 
and the profit from exercised stock options) amounts to 38% of the total compensation.
3  Código de Buen Gobierno de las Sociedades Cotizadas, CNMV (2015).
4  Informe Anual de las Remuneraciones de los Consejeros de las Sociedades Cotizadas, CNMV (2015).
SOURCE: Fernandes et al. (2013).
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Chart 1 from Frydman and Saks (2010) shows that the large weight of equity based 
compensation in the U.S. is a recent fact. Until the 1960s, equity-based compensation 
was rare among U.S. companies. Executive compensation consisted basically of fixed 
salary and cash bonuses. Since the 1960s, stock grants started to become usual in long-
term incentive plans. The big “revolution” in CEO compensation came when a tax reform 
taxed stock options as capital gains at a much lower tax rate than labour income. As Chart 1 
shows, stock options increased dramatically since the 1980s.
Chart 2 from Frydman and Jenter (2010) compares the two measures of pay-for-
performance for S&P 500 firms. The right axis is the Jensen-Murphy, or percentage stake 
measure, that computes the dollar change in pay per $1,000 increase in firm’s value. The 
SOURCE: Frydman and Saks (2010).
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left axis is the change in dollar pay per 1% change in firm’s value (dollar equity at stake). 
The two lines differ because of the growth in firms’ values over time. Executives tend to 
own smaller stakes in larger firms. As a result, firm’s growth leads to higher equity-at-stake 
incentives. Both measures show an increase in pay-for-performance pay over time.
In this section we survey the theoretical literature studying the theoretical underpinnings of 
how a firm’s leverage is related to the compensation structure of its executives. For a given 
level of compensation, when the variable share is larger we say that compensation is more 
convex, or has a higher pay-for-performance sensitivity.
We should mention that the literature we are reviewing in this section assumes the existence 
of an arms-length relationship between the CEO (the agent) and the compensation committee 
(representing the board and, ultimately, the shareholders). We could term this approach as 
the contractual approach. This is not the only view. Pioneered by the work of Bebchuck and 
Fried (2004), a strand of the literature challenges the arms-length assumption and argues 
that the observed contracts are not justified by firm performance or firm characteristics. This 
literature stresses rent extraction by CEOs interested in their own agendas. 
Since the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Holmstrom (1979), it is well understood 
that linking compensation to performance is a powerful instrument to align the interests of 
executives and shareholders. For example, the investment choices of under-diversified, risk 
averse executives may conflict with the interest of well-diversified shareholders. The former 
may decide to avoid risky projects with positive Net Present Value, to focus on conservative 
investments. Shareholders may encourage risk-taking by increasing the vega of their 
executives compensation. For example, by including stock options in the CEO’s compensation 
package. This is the wealth effect component discussed before in equation [3]. 
The seminal paper linking compensation structure and leverage is John and John (1993). 
In this paper, the authors study a model that incorporates a moral hazard conflict between 
shareholders and executives. Higher delta in the executive’s compensation may, as we 
have seen, align the incentives of both agents. On the other side, higher delta exacerbates 
the executive’s risk appetite resulting into a risk-shifting conflict between shareholders 
and bondholders. Bondholders will discount this conflict pushing up bond premia. To 
mitigate the extra cost of debt induced by risk-shifting, the optimal compensation contract 
will reduce pay-performance sensitivity as firm’s leverage increases. 
Contrary to the risk-shifting incentives, Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) show 
empirically that options may decrease incentives for risk-taking. Theoretically, the models 
of Carpenter (2000) and Ross (2004) predict that, for risk averse executives, higher stock 
volatility entail a negative risk-aversion effect which may dominate the wealth effect. 
Confirming the previous prediction, Lewellen (2006) shows that if managers are risk averse 
and not well diversified, in-the-money options discourage executives risk-taking and 
leverage for a wide range of parameters. In other words, if the manager’s risk-aversion is 
large enough and she cannot hedge her exposure to the firm’s stock volatility, the risk-
premium component in [3] encourages executives to reduce firm’s leverage as the options’ 
vega increases. Carlson and Lazrak (2010) show that risk-averse managers more exposed 
to variable pay exhibit lower leverage. 
The models proposed in all these papers provide arguments for why the level of leverage 
across different firms should be negatively related to the ratio of variable pay to the fixed 
3  Compensation 
and Firm’s Leverage. 
Theory
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component of the total CEO compensation. However, the empirical literature, reports conflicting 
findings on whether the correlation between pay-for-performance compensation and firm’s 
leverage is positive or negative [Tosun (2015)]. Edmans and Gabaix (2016) discuss that the 
literature lacks a model in which leverage and compensation are jointly determined in a 
framework that allows for risk aversion, effort, risk taking and endogenous costs of borrowing. 
Gete and Gomez (2017) is a first attempt to endogenize effort and leverage decisions in a 
model with exogenous cost of borrowing. The authors analyze the interaction between 
leverage and executive compensation in a model in which the executives’ choice of effort 
is endogenous and affects the likelihood of a crisis. Making CEO’s effort endogenous 
unveils a novel channel for the relation between leverage and compensation. In particular, 
when the CEO is optimistic about asset prices in states of distress, there is a complementarity 
between effort and leverage. Optimism encourages higher leverage, and higher leverage 
entices higher effort to avoid the larger losses if the low state on nature is realized. 
Simultaneously, as the manager is compensated with equity, the manager has more 
incentives to supply effort in a more leveraged firm. 
Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) revisit the existing theory and by making effort, leverage and 
credit spreads endogenous, expands it with new insights. The authors describe an economy 
with one firm that is owned by a shareholder who in turn has to hire a CEO to run the firm. The 
model also has a lender from whom the CEO borrows. The CEO is risk-averse while the 
shareholder and the lender are risk-neutral. The firm is exposed to productivity shocks whose 
mean is increasing in CEO’s effort. This effort is costly for the CEO and noncontractable. The 
CEO receives a compensation contract composed of a fixed part and a share of the firm’s 
profits. She decides effort and leverage. The lender prices firm’s leverage with an endogenous 
spread over its costs of funds to be compensated for the risk of default from the firm.
The paper shows that the sign of the cross-sectional correlation between the level of 
leverage and the structure of compensation depends on the interplay of three channels: 
a) More convex compensation encourages effort by exposing the CEO to the rewards from 
higher firms’ profits (increasing the CEO’s pay-for-performance sensitivity); b) Like in Gete 
and Gómez (2017), there is a complementarity between leverage and effort that encourages 
leverage. That is, more convex compensation induces higher effort and since this makes 
bad shocks less likely then leverage increases; c) When the CEO is risk-averse, more 
convex compensation discourages leverage. The basic trade-off faced by the CEO is the 
level of variable compensation to accept and how much to borrow. This arises because 
both of these factors are sources of risk for her. That is, her total compensation has higher 
variance when either pay-for-performance or leverage are larger.
Channels a) and b) above generate a positive cross-sectional correlation between the level 
of leverage and the degree of convexity of executive compensation. Channel c) induces a 
negative correlation. For plausible calibrations the authors find that, except when variable 
compensation or CEO’s risk-aversion are small, channel c) dominates and the correlation 
between the level of leverage and pay-for-performance compensation is negative.
Interestingly, Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) predict that the relationship between the change 
in leverage and variable compensation is unambiguously positive after an expansive shift 
in credit supply. This happens because the variable component makes the CEO more 
exposed to firm’s value. Since the credit subsidy generated from the monetary policy shift 
increases the value of the borrowing firm, its CEO will borrow more if she is promised a 
larger share of the firm (i.e. higher variable compensation).
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Moreover, after expansive credit policies, the shareholder offers contracts with less 
variable pay. The shareholder understands that after the stimulus the CEO is supplying 
more effort and choosing higher leverage, which are complements, and sees less need to 
provide variable compensation to motivate the CEO.
Both compensation and firm’s risk are endogenous. Thus, there are reverse causality 
problems. Variable compensation can encourage or discourage leverage for the reasons 
discussed above. However, it may also be the case that shareholders anticipate the risk 
conditions that the firm will face and design CEO’s compensation to optimize their 
performance. Moreover, there may exist other reasons (omitted variables) that 
simultaneously drive compensation and risk-sensitivity. Thus, it is a difficult empirical 
problem to analyze whether compensation drives firm’s risk. We review next how the 
literature has dealt with this problem.
Palia (2001) uses a system of simultaneous equations on panel data to investigate the 
relation between managerial pay-performance sensitivity and firm’s value, controlling for 
the CEO’s age, education and experience. His results show no relation between the firm’s 
Q-value and CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity. 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) use the change of the Financial Accounting Standards in 
the U.S. in 2005. According to this regulation, options had to be accounted for at their fair 
value and not at their intrinsic value. This regulatory change made options less attractive 
than restricted stock. The authors find that higher vega leads to more leverage, while 
higher delta is associated with lower leverage. Hayes, Lemmon, and Qui (2012) examine 
the relation between option pay and executives’ risk-taking exploiting the same change in 
accounting regulation than Chava and Purnanandam (2010). However, they do not find a 
strong relation between the decline in option pay and less risky investments. 
Shue and Towsend (2017) use a creative instrumental variable to identify causality. They 
use multi-year option plans as instrument because the expected number of granted 
options does not change with firm’s performance. The authors find that a 10% increase in 
new options granted leads to a 2.8-4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk 
is driven largely by higher leverage. A similar conclusion is obtained by Panousi and 
Papanikolau (2012). They show that the negative effect of idiosyncratic risk on investment 
is stronger when risk-averse executives hold a higher fraction of the firm’s stock.
Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) use data on corporate leverage and compensation from 
China’s 2008 credit stimulus. The goal is to study how the structure of compensation alters 
firms’ incentives to borrow. China is unique as its banking sector is almost completely 
state owned. This addresses the problems associated with the transmission of monetary 
and credit policy when risk-averse or poorly capitalized banks refuse to expand credit. 
This “supply” side problem of credit expansion has been the focus of the bank lending 
channel literature [see for example Gambacorta and Shin (2016) or Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011)]. However, this issue is absent in China given the complete control 
of the banking sector by the government. Deng et al. (2015) state this bluntly: “Beijing 
ordered state-owned banks to lend and they lent.”
Following an unexpected deterioration of the economy in the fourth quarter of 2008, China’s 
government suddenly exhorted banks to lend more and at cheaper rates. Total loan quotas, 
which are the lending targets that bank officials should meet, were increased from $4.9 
trillion CNY in 2008 to almost $10 trillion CNY in 2009 [Cong and Ponticelli (2017)]. At the 
4  Compensation 
and Firm’s Leverage. 
Empirical Work
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same time, the Central Bank dramatically lowered banks’ reserve requirements and 
expanded money supply. The annualized growth rate of real M2 went up from 14.9% in 
2008Q4 to 26.2% in 2009Q1, and to 33.9% in 2009Q2. Ouyang and Peng (2015) state 
that “this was the biggest stimulus program in the world, equal to about the three times 
size of the U.S. effort.” The literature agrees that nobody anticipated this large credit 
stimulus [Naughton (2009) and Deng et al. (2015)].
Dahiya, Gete and Ge (2017) show that the level of leverage and CEO’s variable share of 
compensation are negatively correlated in the cross-section of Chinese firms. This 
suggests that CEO’s risk-aversion is a dominant factor. Second, right after the 2008 credit 
push, the firms with a higher share of variable compensation increase their leverage faster. 
Thus, the structure of the executive compensation has a significant influence on which 
firms reacted more to the credit stimulus. The results are robust across different 
specifications and controlling for the main alternative drivers of compensation and 
leverage. They are particularly strong for firms in the real-estate sector. This suggests an 
interesting interaction between increases in leverage induced by convex compensation, 
and those caused by higher collateral values [Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar (2012), or 
Cvijanović (2014)].
From what we have reviewed above, there is theoretical and empirical support for the 
structure of compensation driving leverage dynamics. Following the 2008 financial crisis, 
there has been a lively debate in the academic and policy circles about regulating executive 
compensation to avoid excessive firms’ leverage. In this section we survey some work on 
the optimal regulation.
John et al. (2000), Bebchuk and Spamann (2009), Bolton et al. (2011), Raviv and Sisli-Ciamarra 
(2013), Hakenes and Schnabel (2014), or Thanassoulis (2014) propose arguments for 
regulation based on risk-shifting problems and externalities from competition in labor markets. 
Gete and Gómez (2015) analyzes the impact of remuneration practices on banks’ risk-taking, 
captured by the level of short-term leverage, in a model with fire sales externalities but 
exogenous effort and exogenous compensation contracts. Fire sales externalities are at the 
center of the new macroprudential approach to regulation [Kashyap et al. (2011)]. Fire sales 
occur when financially distressed firms need to sell assets at prices below their value in a 
best-use scenario. Fire sales can be quite sizeable and lead to high discounts relative to face 
value. For instance, in March 2012, Spain’s Banco Santander sold property-backed loans for 
EUR 750 million at a 62 percent discount to face value. In June of the same year, the UK’s 
Lloyds sold property-backed loans for EUR 971 million after a discount of 52 percent.
Gete and Gómez (2015) show that when fire sales externalities are not internalized by a 
bank’s shareholders and executives, borrowing is higher than the socially optimal level. 
Regulating executive compensation can achieve socially superior outcomes because it 
alters the incentives of bank executives. They analyze four compensation structures 
proposed by the academic literature: 
1 First, plain-vanilla equity fails to internalize fire sales externalities, as it does 
not “penalize” short-term relative to long-term payoffs. 
2) and 3) Deferred equity and long-term bonuses unrelated to short-term profits 
can restore the efficiency loss induced by the fire sales externality. Long-term 
bonuses unrelated to short-term profits increase the opportunity cost of fire 
5  Executive 
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sales, thus, reducing fire sales. Deferred compensation works if agents value 
one dollar less in the future than in the present. If that is the case, then 
deferred compensation reduces the rewards from short-term debt. Thus, it 
lowers the incentives to leverage and sell at a discount in the case of a liquidity 
shock. Deferred compensation would be useless if it is invested in an interest-
making account paying the same interest rate as the bank executives’ 
discount rate. In fact, deferred compensation can be thought of as a tax on 
compensation, where the tax rate is the executives’ discount rate. 
4) Bail-in bonds reduce incentives to short-term debt by paying equity in cases 
of bank distress, in which equity has no value. The advantage of bail-in bonds 
is that they are a “cheaper” way to provide incentives. They increase the 
opportunity cost of fire sales in periods with liquidity needs while avoiding any 
remuneration for executives in periods with no liquidity problems.
Compensation schemes in real life are actually more complex than in this model. They may 
include severance packages (which may increase the compensation’s vega), trading 
restrictions (to limit the manager’s ability to game the compensation incentives), or vesting 
periods for stock options. These mechanisms may help to curb CEO’s risk appetite. Our 
numerical exercises, however, show that regulating the level of compensation can have 
unintended consequences. Setting upper or lower bounds on the number of shares, 
deferred shares and/or the size of long-term bonuses may lead bank executives to an 
overcautious choice of debt and, ultimately, fire sales below the socially optimal level. 
Based on these insights, Gete and Gómez (2017) show that, when the CEO’s choices of 
leverage and effort are endogenous, letting shareholders vote on the design of compensation 
schemes (like say-on-pay schemes) fails to prevent socially inefficient firms’ overleverage. 
Regulating the ratio of variable-to-fixed payments (but not the level of compensation) can 
deliver socially optimal leverage levels. 
Gete and Gómez (2017) conclude that, at least for risk-neutral agents, the optimal regulation 
is not the regulation of executive compensation. A cap on debt is socially more efficient: it 
can restore the efficient level of debt with a lower distortion in managerial effort. Whether 
this result holds after introducing managerial risk aversion remains open for future research. 
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